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Abstract
Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit.
We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power dis-
tribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of
the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union.
Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the threshold of the number of
member states required for a decision. An exit that modifies this threshold benefits
the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change
benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, the threat of Brexit
would have worked differently before the entry of Croatia.
Keywords— European Union, qualified majority voting, power index, Brexit
1 Introduction
Since the European Union membership referendum of the United Kingdom (UK) in 2016, Brexit
(the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU)), its possible effects have
become a subject of political debates in several countries, like the Czech Republic, France, or
Greece (Lyons and Darroch, 2016). Although it might be worth inspecting several political and
economic effects of an exit from the European Union, in this paper, we look at one aspect: how
the power distribution changes in the Council of the European Union. Kóczy (2016) has shown
that Brexit will mainly benefit large countries. In this paper, we firstly try to explore whether
the same will remain true if another country will left. Secondly, we want to answer the question:
what would be the effect of Brexit if Croatia had not joined the EU?
The Council of the European Union, often referred to as the Council of Ministers, is an insti-
tute that represents the governments of the member states. It accepts EU law and synchronizes
the policy of the EU. Along with the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union is
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the main decision-making body of the EU. Every member state is represented by an individual.
The difference in size among the member states appears in a weighted qualified majority voting.
Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, a voting is successful if
1. at least 55% of the member states (member quota), which
2. represent at least 65% of the habitants (population quota)
support the decision. Such a recreation of the weights enables us to calculate how the power
distribution changes if a country leaves the European Union.
Several studies have addressed how voting power affects the overall likelihood of decision-
making (Felsenthal and Machover, 1997, 2001). Warntjen (2017) has shown empirically that
there is a stable positive relationship between the number of votes backing a member state
request to change European legislation and its success probability. Therefore, it is an important
question to measure how much power the countries have in the Council of the European Union.
Concerning our methodology, we use two well-known power indices: (1) the Shapley-Shubik
index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954); and (2) the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971;
Penrose, 1946). These measures show that if a decision is made, what probability a particular
player has in being instrumental in making that decision. Translate this into voting about the
spending of the budget, the indices reflect the probability of spending one (or a million) euro is
according to the interests of this particular player. For several cases of departure, we show the
change made by an exit until 2030, which can be called a ’farsighted’ sense.
We find a pattern connected to a change in the threshold of the required number of member
states. An exit which changes in the population quota benefits the large, an exit that does not
cause such a change benefits the small countries. Our results point in the direction that if the
UK had left the European Union before the entry of Croatia, the effect would have been reversed,
it would have favored the power of the small countries.
The paper is structured in the following way. Power indices to be used are defined and
presented in Section 2. The results of our calculations together with their interpretation are
detailed in Section 3.
2 Methodology
It is popular to study voting situations as simple cooperative games, where the players are
the voters. The value of any coalition (a subset of the player set) is 1 if its players can decide a
question, or 0 if not. According to Felsenthal and Machover (2004), there are two interpretations
of voting power. One conception, the influence power (I-power) focuses on voting power conceived
of as a voter’s potential impact on the result of divisions of the decision-making institute: whether
the policies proposed are adopted or rejected. The second conception, prize power (P-power)
focuses on a voter’s expected share of a fixed prize given to the winning coalition. It is more
appropriate to use P-power if one wants to calculate the part of the EU budget a member can
expect to control, however, it is not suitable to compare different voting situations.
The most common measures of power in voting games are the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf
indices. They are used extensively for determining power in the Council of the European Union
(Felsenthal and Machover, 2001; Herne and Nurmi, 1993; Kóczy, 2012; Widgrén, 1994). Since
we investigate a phenomenon that belongs to the P-Power, it is best to focus more on analyzing
the power distribution of the Council of the European Union with the Shapley-Shubik index
(Felsenthal and Machover, 1998).
The Shapley-Shubik index is an application of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for simple
voting games. Its principle can be described as follows: voters arrive in a random order, and
when a coalition becomes winning, the full credit is given to the pivotal player arriving last. A
player’s power is specified by the proportion of orders in which it plays this role. The index
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shows that if a decision is made, what probability a particular player has in being instrumental
in making that decision. Let N denote the set of players and let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary subset of
N . We use the corresponding lower-case letters to denote the cardinality of sets, so that s = |S|
and n = |N |.
Definition 1. (Shapley-Shubik index ) For any simple voting game v, player i’s Shapley-Shubik
index is as follows: ∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
v
(
S ∪ {i}
)
− v
(
S
))
.
The Banzhaf index, which is the normalized Banzhaf-value (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971;
Penrose, 1946), uses a different approach. A player is called critical if it can turn a winning
coalition into a losing one. The index shows what is the probability that a player influences a
decision.
Definition 2. Player i’s Banzhaf value is:
∑
S⊆N\{i}
1
2n−1
(
v
(
S ∪ {i}
)
− v
(
S
))
=
ηi(v)
2n−1
,
where ηi(v) is player i’s Banzhaf score, the number of coalitions where i is critical.
Usually its normalized value is reported as the measure of voting power.
Definition 3. The Banzhaf index is the normalized Banzhaf-score:
βi =
ηi(v)∑
j∈N ηj(v)
.
The index shows the voter’s expected relative share of the total payoff.
When a country leaves, we assume that its payment to the EU budget ceases, therefore the
others do not share the same prize as before.1 Taking this into account, we correct the power
index by the following fraction:
Original budget – the payment of the leaving country
Original budget
. (1)
We compute for every country and each exit the adjusted power index as a percentage of the
pre-exit power index. Since the adjusted power indices may not sum to 1, we cannot define them
as probabilities, however, they still express a reasonable financial share. The following example
presents an application of the new indices.
Example 1. In the predecessor of the EU (the European Economic Community (ECC)), the six
founding states already used a weighted voting system. The weight of the large countries (France,
Germany, Italy) was 4, the weight of the medium-sized states (Belgium, the Netherlands) was 2,
and the weight of the smallest state (Luxembourg) was 1. The decision threshold was 12.
According to Table 1, Luxembourg’s power was 0. France, Germany, and Italy contributed
28% to the EEC budget, Belgium and the Netherlands paid 7.9%, while Luxembourg paid
only 0.2%. If Luxembourg would have exited and the decision-threshold had not changed, the
remaining countries’ Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices would have remained the same, but
the adjusted indices would have decreased (see Table 2).
If a large country, for example, France, departs, and the threshold decreases to 9, then the
change is more spectacular. The correction ratio, according to formula (1), is 0.72. Table 3 shows
the power measured by the adjusted Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The only winner of
this exit is Luxembourg.
1 It is a simplification, as some non-EU member countries, like Norway, also contribute to the EU
budget in a certain sense. The final financial conditions of the Brexit are unknown.
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Member State Weight S-S index (%) Bz index (%)
France 4 23.33 23.80
Germany 4 23.33 23.80
Italy 4 23.33 23.80
Belgium 2 15.00 14.29
Netherlands 2 15.00 14.29
Luxemburg 1 0 0
Table 1: Decision-making in the Council of Ministers in 1958 (Kóczy, 2009), Shapley-
Shubik (S-S) and Banzhaf (Bz) indices
Member state
S-S index
After
Bz index
After
Adjusted
S-S index
Adjusted
Bz index
France 23.33 23.80 23.25 23.32
Germany 23.33 23.80 23.25 23.32
Italy 23.33 23.80 23.25 23.32
Belgium 15.00 14.29 14.97 14.00
Netherlands 15.00 14.29 14.97 14.00
Table 2: The effect of Luxembourg’s departure from the Council of Ministers in 1958,
Shapley-Shubik (S-S) and Banzhaf (Bz) indices in percentages
Member
State
S-S index
Before
S-S index
After
Adjusted
S-S index
Bz index
Before
Bz index
After
Adjusted
Bz index
Germany 23.33 30.00 ↓ 21.60 23.80 30.43 ↓ 21.91
Italy 23.33 30.00 ↓ 21.60 23.80 30.43 ↓ 21.91
Belgium 15.00 13.33 ↓ 9.60 14.29 13.04 ↓ 9.39
Netherlands 15.00 13.33 ↓ 9.60 14.29 13.04 ↓ 9.39
Luxemburg 0 13.33 ↑ 9.60 0 13.04 ↑ 9.39
Table 3: The effect of France’s departure from the Council of Ministers in 1958, Shapley-
Shubik (S-S) and Banzhaf (Bz) indices in percentages
3 Results
In this section, we present our findings. Currently, pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, a qualified
majority voting is successful in the Council of the European Union if
1. at least 55% of the member states (member quota), which
2. represent at least 65% of the habitants (population quota)
support the decision. Furthermore, a blocking minority must include at least four Council mem-
bers, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained (Council of the European Union,
2017). This condition can be called the blocking minority rule.2
2 For further details about the blocking minority rule, please see Appendix E.
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We use population projections for 2015, 2020 and 2030 from Eurostat (Eurostat, 2014) and
budget data from the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2015) (See Appendix A). The
software IOP-Indices of Power (Bräuninger and König, 2005) is used to calculate the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The IOP cannot handle large numbers, thus population data are
entered in 100,000s that may have a marginal effect on the indices. For the sake of simplicity, we
disregarded the blocking minority rule in the calculations of adjusted power indices, which also
have some minor effect (see Appendix E).
Kóczy (2016) has shown that if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, which have
currently 28 member states, the smallest member states’ power indices decrease. We have found
the same result after repeating the calculation for every other member state (see Appendix B).
However, a further question remains: what happens if another member state leaves the EU?
Here, we discuss the effects of the Czech Republic (Czexit) or Germany leaving the EU, after
Brexit. Secondly, building on our previous finding, we have inspected what would be the effect
of Brexit on the power distribution of the EU had the United Kingdom left it before Croatia
entered? Is Brexit in this sense a belated threat? Our results show that it is.
In the following, we will call a country large or small regarding its population. We observe a
general pattern, which connects the change in the member state quota to a change in the power
distribution: when this threshold is modified by the departure, the power indices of the large
countries increase. When such a change is not evoked by the departure, the power indices of the
small countries increase.
3.1 The impact of additional departures to Brexit
In the computations which investigate the results of an additional departure to Brexit, we base
our calculations on the 27-member Union without the UK, because Brexit appears to be a fact if
any further exit happens. As mentioned in the previous section, it is also considered that an exit
of a country causes a change in the budget. The example of the Czech Republic is presented first
because the EU-skeptical sentiment has become stronger recently in this country.3 The budget
correction ratio is 0.989 according to formula (1). Figure 1 shows the budget-adjusted change in
power indices due to Czexit as the function of the population.
We find that in the case of Czexit, the power indices of the small countries increase, and the
power indices of the large countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain slightly
decrease. The main winners from Czexit are Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta. The same
can be said if one investigates Czexit in a farsighted sense, meaning to repeat the analysis with
population predictions for 2020 and 2030. The only country which power index change differs is
Romania: from a slight decrease (see Figure 1), its power modestly increases (see Figure 2).
We get similar results for other departures from a 27-member EU: the power indices of the
small countries increase significantly. The detailed results for all member states can be seen in
Appendix C. What has created more variation in these cases is the contribution of the particular
country to the EU budget. To illustrate this point, let us look at the exit of Germany.
In the case of Germany’s exit (Figure 3a), the Shapley-Shubik indices of the smallest countries
and Poland increase, while the other countries all lose power. This is because countries with large
populations are also the ones that contribute the most, so the budget loss exceeds the power
gains caused by the departure of Germany. The correction ratio (1) is 0.711.
The results concerning Poland are especially interesting. If one of the four large countries
(Germany, France, Italy, or Spain) leaves, Poland is much better off than Romania or Spain
which are the closest countries in size of the population. In all four cases, its Shapley-Shubik
index increases despite the other remaining large countries’ power decrease.
3 In January 2018, Miloš Zeman, the openly Eurosceptic President of the Czech Republic was re-
elected.
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Figure 1: Effect of Czexit with populations for 2015, adjusted Shapley-Shubik index
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Figure 2: Effect of Czexit with population projections for 2030, adjusted Shapley-Shubik
index
The simulations have been repeated with the other popular power measure, the Banzhaf
index. We get the same results, the power of small countries increases. The largest difference
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(a) Adjusted Shapley-Shubik index
10
6
10
7
10
8
80
85
90
95
100
CY
LV
LT
IE
FIBG
SE
PT
EL
NL
IT
EE
SI
HR SK
DK
AT
HU CZ
BE
RO
ES
FR
MT
PL
LU
Population (logarithmic scale)
N
ew
p
ow
er
in
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
th
e
p
ow
er
b
ef
or
e
th
e
ex
it
(1
0
0
in
d
ic
at
es
n
o
ch
an
ge
)
(b) Adjusted Banzhaf index
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Figure 3: Effect of the German exit
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is in the case of Germany. As one can see in Figure 3b, with the use of the Banzhaf index, all
countries, including Poland lose power. As there is no significant difference, and the Banzhaf
index rather represents the I-Power approach (Felsenthal and Machover, 2004), the Shapley-
Shubik index is applied in the following.
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Figure 4: Change in power due to Czexit in the 26-member EU (after Brexit and
Germany’s exit), adjusted Shapley-Shubik index
Calculations of another country leaving the 26-member EU, for instance, if the Czech Re-
public leaves after Germany show a similar pattern to Brexit (Figure 4). This can be elucidated
by the fact that as the number of member states decreases from 26 to 25, the Council of the
European Union’s threshold for the number of supporting member states (determined by the
member quota) decreases from 15 to 14. In this case, small countries would lose while the power
of the large countries would increase.
3.2 The effect of Brexit before the accession of Croatia
Since our findings on an additional departure show an impact that is the inverse of Brexit’s
(Kóczy, 2016), Brexit might have a different impact before the accession of Croatia compared to
the exit from the 28-member EU.
This has significance because if Brexit had decreased the power of large countries such as
France and Germany, the impact of the potential Brexit would have been calculated differently
by these states that usually dominate the policy of the EU: Brexit would have been a greater
risk for them. In other words, if Brexit would have had the reverse impact before Croatia’s
membership, it could be seen as a belated threat.
We find that Brexit before the accession of Croatia would have favored smaller and would
have harmed larger countries (Figure 5). The results are similar not only for Brexit but for the
case of an exit of any other member state from the EU without Croatia (see Appendix D).
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Figure 5: Effect of Brexit before Croatia joined the EU, adjusted Shapley-Shubik index
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Figure 6: Effect of a departure from the EU after Brexit, adjusted Shapley-Shubik index
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3.3 A generalization of the results
Note that an additional departure to Brexit has an inverted impact compared to Brexit’s impact
from the 28-member EU, but it is similar to the potential effect of Brexit if it had happened before
Croatia’s membership. Results for a departure from the hypothetical 26-member European Union
have a strong resemblance to the consequences of Brexit. The inverted impact of an additional
departure to Brexit is due to the fact that 15 countries are necessary to make a voting successful
in the case of both 26 and 27 members. However, after an additional exit the population threshold
decreases.
The voting rule states two main requirements: the support of a given number of countries and
a certain percentage of the population. A country will turn a losing coalition into a winning one
if (a) the coalition just misses a member state to pass the threshold, and/or (b) if the coalition
has the required participation, but the supporting countries are too small to reach the population
quota.
With Czexit after Brexit, the population threshold decreases while the member state thresh-
old remains the same, so coalitions with smaller countries become winning, which shifts power
from the large to the small member states. This pattern is quite prevalent, we find similar results
using population projections for 2020 and 2030 (Figure 2).
It seems to be a general pattern that an exit triggering a decrease in the quota benefits large,
while an exit not triggering such a change benefits small member states.
In the case of 27 member states, voting is successful if at least 15 countries, having together
at least a population of 288 million vote in favor. We have examined the number of countries
whose power increases if a particular country leaves, which can be considered as a yes vote for
the exit of the departing country. Figure 6 presents the number of countries and their total
population with an increasing power. Most of the countries would get a positive vote for leaving
from 20 or 21 countries, but without the required population. However, in the case of Poland,
both thresholds are met, because the power of small and large countries increase, and merely
some medium countries lose power.
4 Conclusions
Inspired by Brexit, the goal of our investigation has been to examine what would happen in
the Council of the European Union after a country’s exit from the EU. For this purpose, the
potential changes in the influence of each country have been measured with the use of power
indices.
We find that, not just Brexit, but any other exit from the 28-member EU would favor
countries with high population. However, an additional exit would increase the power of small
countries. Furthermore, we observe a general pattern which is linked to the change in the
member-state threshold. An exit, which changes the number of member states required for a
decision, benefits the large, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small
countries. Thus a hypothetical Brexit before the accession of Croatia would harm large countries’
power in the Council.
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Appendix A – Population and contribution data
Member
state
Abbrev.
Population
2015
Population
2020
Population
2030
Contrib.
ratio (%)
Austria AT 86 88 93 1.22
Belgium BE 113 118 129 2.85
Bulgaria BG 72 70 65 0.31
Croatia HR 42 42 41 0.3
Cyprus CY 9 9 9 0.11
Czech Republic CZ 105 106 108 1.02
Denmark DK 56 58 61 1.72
Estonia EE 13 13 12 0.14
Finland FI 55 56 59 1.38
France FR 662 677 704 15.22
Germany DE 807 806 798 20.08
Greece EL 110 107 101 1.42
Hungary HU 99 98 97 0.69
Ireland IE 46 46 46 1.11
Italy IT 609 620 641 11.18
Latvia LV 20 19 16 0.19
Lithuania LT 29 27 22 0.25
Luxembourg LU 6 6 8 0.18
Malta MT 4 4 5 0.05
Netherlands NL 169 171 176 4.97
Poland PL 385 384 375 2.74
Portugal PT 104 101 98 1.27
Romania RO 199 197 190 1.05
Slovakia SK 54 54 53 0.49
Slovenia SI 21 21 21 0.25
Spain ES 464 458 445 7.76
Sweden SE 97 101 110 2.98
United Kingdom UK 646 667 705 8.82
Table 4: Member states of the EU – population (in 100,000s) and financial contribution
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Appendix B – The impact of any member state leaving
the 28-member EU
The following table presents the impact of any member state leaving the 28-member EU. The
country labels in the columns refer to the country that is leaving the EU, the rows show the
remaining member states. The values represent the change (new adjusted S-S power index)/(old
adjusted S-S power index) in basis points (1/100th of 1%). Bold indicates incresing, while italic
signs decreasing power.
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU
AT ↓287 ↓124 ↓261 ↓121 ↓1250 ↓317 ↓254 ↓151 ↓481 ↓287 ↓966 ↓213 ↓113
BE ↓68 ↓19 ↓119 ↓5 ↓1137 ↓184 ↓112 ↓34 ↓419 ↓153 ↓868 ↓67 ↑13
BG ↓285 ↓375 ↓359 ↓227 ↓1380 ↓427 ↓354 ↓248 ↓490 ↓398 ↓1075 ↓319 ↓206
CY ↓1170 ↓1223 ↓1140 ↓1090 ↓2472 ↓1299 ↓1279 ↓1100 ↓929 ↓1278 ↓1852 ↓1227 ↓1073
CZ ↓105 ↓192 ↓35 ↓155 ↓1159 ↓211 ↓148 ↓54 ↓418 ↓180 ↓878 ↓109 ↓14
DE ↑348 ↑215 ↑426 ↑369 ↑398 ↑257 ↑369 ↑360 ↑544 ↑293 ↑297 ↑386 ↑418
DK ↓434 ↓529 ↓392 ↓500 ↓374 ↓1545 ↓476 ↓398 ↓522 ↓541 ↓1178 ↓451 ↓344
EE ↓1067 ↓1138 ↓1042 ↓1192 ↓1002 ↓2349 ↓1206 ↓1013 ↓889 ↓1184 ↓1782 ↓1124 ↓963
EL ↓78 ↓185 ↓28 ↓126 ↓14 ↓1146 ↓192 ↓120 ↓403 ↓160 ↓877 ↓79 ↑12
ES ↑297 ↑137 ↑388 ↑350 ↑323 ↑16 ↑231 ↑350 ↑284 ↑266 ↑125 ↑369 ↑354
FI ↓454 ↓542 ↓408 ↓506 ↓385 ↓1555 ↓575 ↓499 ↓409 ↓527 ↓1182 ↓457 ↓358
FR ↑346 ↑207 ↑429 ↑382 ↑393 ↑160 ↑266 ↑380 ↑355 ↑526 ↑302 ↑400 ↑416
HR ↓586 ↓682 ↓524 ↓649 ↓529 ↓1713 ↓695 ↓640 ↓553 ↓624 ↓667 ↓1294 ↓502
HU ↓124 ↓234 ↓62 ↓186 ↓68 ↓1191 ↓253 ↓171 ↓96 ↓425 ↓222 ↓887 ↓139
IT ↑327 ↑184 ↑406 ↑367 ↑368 ↑54 ↑241 ↑367 ↑330 ↑535 ↑277 ↑71 ↑375 ↑393
IE ↓552 ↓637 ↓484 ↓604 ↓485 ↓1655 ↓662 ↓600 ↓513 ↓590 ↓634 ↓1269 ↓540 ↓469
LT ↓739 ↓810 ↓678 ↓848 ↓672 ↓1914 ↓855 ↓841 ↓685 ↓769 ↓830 ↓1445 ↓768 ↓649
LU ↓1248 ↓1300 ↓1206 ↓1401 ↓1176 ↓2568 ↓1389 ↓1369 ↓1168 ↓962 ↓1364 ↓1931 ↓1311 ↓1136
LV ↓901 ↓975 ↓865 ↓1028 ↓826 ↓2130 ↓1045 ↓1014 ↓850 ↓841 ↓1018 ↓1629 ↓960 ↓809
MT ↓1308 ↓1368 ↓1278 ↓1451 ↓1234 ↓2632 ↓1444 ↓1437 ↓1247 ↓996 ↓1423 ↓1986 ↓1359 ↓1208
NL ↑96 ↑6 ↑141 ↑63 ↑172 ↓1008 ↓31 ↑66 ↑142 ↓455 ↑1 ↓853 ↑83 ↑187
PL ↑213 ↑62 ↑292 ↑235 ↑244 ↓645 ↑134 ↑237 ↑209 ↓873 ↑167 ↓582 ↑263 ↑277
PT ↓112 ↓202 ↓42 ↓160 ↓28 ↓1163 ↓216 ↓153 ↓60 ↓420 ↓184 ↓879 ↓118 ↓26
RO ↑186 ↑82 ↑253 ↑134 ↑251 ↓1043 ↑69 ↑136 ↑219 ↓582 ↑101 ↓889 ↑187 ↑264
SE ↓133 ↓239 ↓79 ↓195 ↓76 ↓1196 ↓260 ↓188 ↓103 ↓418 ↓229 ↓885 ↓144 ↓50
SI ↓868 ↓934 ↓843 ↓1001 ↓801 ↓2102 ↓1013 ↓985 ↓827 ↓829 ↓990 ↓1611 ↓932 ↓777
SK ↓465 ↓553 ↓416 ↓513 ↓392 ↓1565 ↓582 ↓506 ↓421 ↓526 ↓553 ↓1187 ↓465 ↓366
UK ↑346 ↑201 ↑425 ↑376 ↑387 ↑136 ↑262 ↑376 ↑347 ↑541 ↑298 ↑142 ↑398 ↑415
Table 5: The impact of any member state leaving the 28-member European Union
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IT IE LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
AT ↓652 ↓276 ↓233 ↓275 ↓258 ↓264 ↓359 ↑215 ↓163 ↑153 ↓349 ↓261 ↓203 ↓252
BE ↓502 ↓140 ↓88 ↓129 ↓107 ↓119 ↓227 ↑243 ↓31 ↑272 ↓221 ↓112 ↓65 ↓219
BG ↓705 ↓386 ↓353 ↓371 ↓365 ↓361 ↓445 ↑164 ↓251 ↑42 ↓436 ↓368 ↓315 ↓407
CY ↓1400 ↓1287 ↓1265 ↓1328 ↓1285 ↓1320 ↓1280 ↓495 ↓1099 ↓890 ↓1292 ↓1282 ↓1208 ↓1234
CZ ↓547 ↓181 ↓129 ↓171 ↓139 ↓161 ↓257 ↑248 ↓50 ↑247 ↓248 ↓141 ↓93 ↓238
DE ↑586 ↑309 ↑378 ↑360 ↑373 ↑370 ↑90 ↑826 ↑367 ↑582 ↑178 ↑366 ↑387 ↑1002
DK ↓822 ↓523 ↓473 ↓513 ↓485 ↓503 ↓577 ↑11 ↓400 ↓90 ↓576 ↓487 ↓459 ↓535
EE ↓1322 ↓1187 ↓1168 ↓1206 ↓1186 ↓1202 ↓1195 ↓437 ↓1012 ↓790 ↓1187 ↓1184 ↓1112 ↓1132
EL ↓545 ↓151 ↓110 ↓139 ↓119 ↓129 ↓236 ↑246 ↓39 ↑260 ↓223 ↓123 ↓72 ↓228
ES ↑502 ↑287 ↑367 ↑340 ↑366 ↑352 ↓79 ↓48 ↑295 ↑318 ↑116 ↑359 ↑359 ↑861
FI ↓825 ↓532 ↓480 ↓520 ↓494 ↓515 ↓580 ↑3 ↓407 ↓102 ↓588 ↓495 ↓464 ↓536
FR ↑474 ↑323 ↑394 ↑372 ↑393 ↑382 ↑47 ↑732 ↑364 ↑487 ↑176 ↑386 ↑395 ↑853
HR ↓938 ↓661 ↓618 ↓662 ↓643 ↓669 ↓742 ↓86 ↓548 ↓263 ↓731 ↓643 ↓588 ↓638
HU ↓553 ↓208 ↓163 ↓205 ↓179 ↓194 ↓286 ↑233 ↓97 ↑217 ↓279 ↓184 ↓136 ↓239
IT ↑294 ↑370 ↑358 ↑370 ↑369 ↑21 ↑647 ↑338 ↑460 ↑154 ↑363 ↑370 ↑791
IE ↓907 ↓569 ↓619 ↓595 ↓606 ↓694 ↓57 ↓506 ↓219 ↓697 ↓595 ↓554 ↓612
LT ↓1078 ↓820 ↓861 ↓848 ↓861 ↓912 ↓157 ↓689 ↓431 ↓876 ↓847 ↓751 ↓792
LU ↓1482 ↓1375 ↓1353 ↓1374 ↓1407 ↓1364 ↓557 ↓1197 ↓961 ↓1358 ↓1369 ↓1296 ↓1335
LV ↓1198 ↓1021 ↓1004 ↓1053 ↓1046 ↓1072 ↓294 ↓846 ↓613 ↓1032 ↓1020 ↓943 ↓1004
MT ↓1517 ↓1425 ↓1400 ↓1490 ↓1446 ↓1419 ↓631 ↓1248 ↓1015 ↓1429 ↓1439 ↓1357 ↓1366
NL ↓567 ↑12 ↑67 ↑52 ↑67 ↑58 ↑223 ↑143 ↑503 ↓50 ↑61 ↑90 ↓200
PL ↓287 ↑181 ↑244 ↑226 ↑234 ↑238 ↓155 ↑216 ↑234 ↑36 ↑230 ↑257 ↑91
PT ↓548 ↓185 ↓134 ↓177 ↓144 ↓166 ↓268 ↑238 ↑237 ↓261 ↓147 ↓96 ↓236
RO ↓634 ↑111 ↑163 ↑123 ↑146 ↑133 ↑55 ↑154 ↑220 ↑23 ↑140 ↑191 ↓250
SE ↓553 ↓218 ↓171 ↓206 ↓184 ↓198 ↓299 ↑226 ↓101 ↑206 ↓188 ↓143 ↓232
SI ↓1178 ↓996 ↓970 ↓1029 ↓997 ↓1019 ↓1053 ↓270 ↓821 ↓587 ↓1002 ↓913 ↓982
SK ↓849 ↓539 ↓492 ↓529 ↓498 ↓521 ↓595 ↓0 ↓412 ↓109 ↓596 ↓499 ↓549
UK ↑434 ↑317 ↑392 ↑366 ↑391 ↑378 ↑32 ↑722 ↑358 ↑484 ↑176 ↑384 ↑391
Table 5: The impact of any member state leaving the 28-member European Union
(continued)
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Appendix C – The impact of additional departures to
Brexit
The following table presents the impact of any member state leaving the 27-member EU, after
the United Kingdom departs. The country labels in the columns refer to the country that is
leaving the EU, the rows show the remaining member states. The values represent the change
(new adjusted S-S power index)/(old adjusted S-S power index) in basis points (1/100th of 1%).
Bold indicates increasing, while italic signs decreasing power.
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU
AT ↑337 ↑599 ↑553 ↑553 ↓1038 ↑418 ↑553 ↑502 ↓38 ↑451 ↓485 ↑557 ↑570
BE ↑356 ↑482 ↑365 ↑389 ↓1059 ↑253 ↑377 ↑329 ↓172 ↑287 ↓618 ↑390 ↑415
BG ↑748 ↑578 ↑711 ↑811 ↓884 ↑708 ↑717 ↑745 ↑184 ↑742 ↓279 ↑855 ↑816
CY ↑2427 ↑2238 ↑2569 ↑2548 ↓39 ↑2270 ↑2352 ↑2434 ↑2003 ↑2322 ↑1159 ↑2379 ↑2535
CZ ↑370 ↑244 ↑488 ↑408 ↓1043 ↑305 ↑417 ↑409 ↓129 ↑338 ↓581 ↑439 ↑487
DE ↓343 ↓462 ↓298 ↓364 ↓290 ↓473 ↓363 ↓311 ↓346 ↓436 ↓402 ↓335 ↓255
DK ↑1052 ↑885 ↑1067 ↑926 ↑1105 ↓763 ↑930 ↑1034 ↑420 ↑907 ↓17 ↑985 ↑1121
EE ↑2207 ↑1990 ↑2349 ↑2069 ↑2249 ↓177 ↑2062 ↑2171 ↑1753 ↑2094 ↑924 ↑2171 ↑2248
EL ↑380 ↑188 ↑447 ↑384 ↑414 ↓1056 ↑260 ↑387 ↓167 ↑297 ↓604 ↑403 ↑438
ES ↓358 ↓503 ↓271 ↓319 ↓319 ↓495 ↓442 ↓322 ↓354 ↓405 ↓617 ↓299 ↓287
FI ↑1077 ↑891 ↑1099 ↑936 ↑1133 ↓746 ↑888 ↑958 ↑1066 ↑444 ↑10 ↑999 ↑1135
FR ↓373 ↓511 ↓320 ↓364 ↓334 ↓249 ↓485 ↓366 ↓359 ↓530 ↓448 ↓342 ↓303
HR ↑1173 ↑1044 ↑1302 ↑1175 ↑1263 ↓635 ↑1063 ↑1180 ↑1204 ↑714 ↑1097 ↑132 ↑1265
HU ↑403 ↑292 ↑531 ↑451 ↑455 ↓1031 ↑345 ↑450 ↑454 ↓102 ↑378 ↓563 ↑467
IT ↓354 ↓473 ↓287 ↓359 ↓300 ↓383 ↓469 ↓359 ↓324 ↓316 ↓432 ↓980 ↓333 ↓262
IE ↑1109 ↑1081 ↑1224 ↑1076 ↑1209 ↓673 ↑1027 ↑1080 ↑1259 ↑627 ↑1060 ↑93 ↑1108 ↑1206
LT ↑1494 ↑1353 ↑1622 ↑1522 ↑1611 ↓485 ↑1417 ↑1545 ↑1526 ↑1093 ↑1451 ↑414 ↑1561 ↑1603
LU ↑2561 ↑2456 ↑2736 ↑2483 ↑2769 ↑51 ↑2435 ↑2498 ↑2645 ↑2203 ↑2465 ↑1313 ↑2549 ↑2711
LV ↑1866 ↑1706 ↑2051 ↑1790 ↑1960 ↓314 ↑1804 ↑1822 ↑1877 ↑1475 ↑1843 ↑704 ↑1923 ↑1972
MT ↑2693 ↑2575 ↑2836 ↑2553 ↑2823 ↑102 ↑2529 ↑2580 ↑2773 ↑2331 ↑2561 ↑1429 ↑2660 ↑2795
NL ↑54 ↓99 ↑166 ↑116 ↑96 ↓1147 ↑10 ↑117 ↑54 ↓396 ↑45 ↓787 ↑148 ↑123
PL ↓468 ↓638 ↓372 ↓365 ↓444 ↑201 ↓528 ↓368 ↓490 ↑1535 ↓490 ↑196 ↓376 ↓404
PT ↑381 ↑257 ↑494 ↑409 ↑474 ↓1040 ↑305 ↑422 ↑417 ↓119 ↑341 ↓575 ↑447 ↑497
RO ↓45 ↓204 ↑40 ↑7 ↓6 ↓1180 ↓123 ↑9 ↓50 ↓421 ↓89 ↓852 ↑19 ↑17
SE ↑417 ↑249 ↑529 ↑463 ↑472 ↓1037 ↑342 ↑463 ↑408 ↓102 ↑380 ↓552 ↑461 ↑488
SI ↑1825 ↑1657 ↑2002 ↑1773 ↑1920 ↓333 ↑1783 ↑1783 ↑1845 ↑1447 ↑1816 ↑682 ↑1890 ↑1916
SK ↑1105 ↑919 ↑1109 ↑954 ↑1142 ↓746 ↑904 ↑970 ↑1084 ↑465 ↑937 ↑34 ↑1012 ↑1162
Table 6: The impact of additional departures to Brexit
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IT IE LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK
AT ↓11 ↑475 ↑572 ↑545 ↑561 ↑557 ↑189 ↑149 ↑523 ↑674 ↑305 ↑559 ↑1223
BE ↓129 ↑304 ↑385 ↑349 ↑373 ↑361 ↑16 ↓150 ↑355 ↑498 ↑148 ↑371 ↑2253
BG ↑243 ↑769 ↑769 ↑705 ↑742 ↑708 ↑427 ↑493 ↑775 ↑975 ↑538 ↑742 ↓158
CY ↑1666 ↑2293 ↑2363 ↑2300 ↑2345 ↑2293 ↑2121 ↑3289 ↑2503 ↑2726 ↑2221 ↑2351 ↑2438
CZ ↓95 ↑350 ↑428 ↑392 ↑416 ↑401 ↑54 ↓40 ↑434 ↑547 ↑218 ↑414 ↑438
DE ↓259 ↓419 ↓357 ↓375 ↓361 ↓363 ↓593 ↑42 ↓318 ↓112 ↓504 ↓369 ↓340
DK ↑407 ↑899 ↑964 ↑906 ↑945 ↑916 ↑644 ↑918 ↑1068 ↑1179 ↑824 ↑934 ↑1012
EE ↑1439 ↑2103 ↑2125 ↑2059 ↑2091 ↑2076 ↑1851 ↑2872 ↑2206 ↑2504 ↑1945 ↑2095 ↑2203
EL ↓116 ↑310 ↑395 ↑357 ↑393 ↑371 ↑26 ↓117 ↑380 ↑517 ↑175 ↑392 ↑396
ES ↓218 ↓382 ↓310 ↓331 ↓317 ↓321 ↓639 ↑1320 ↓346 ↓158 ↓538 ↓325 ↓308
FI ↑415 ↑926 ↑988 ↑930 ↑960 ↑936 ↑669 ↑959 ↑1098 ↑1211 ↑855 ↑954 ↑1025
FR ↓709 ↓424 ↓360 ↓374 ↓365 ↓361 ↓650 ↑124 ↓361 ↓148 ↓551 ↓373 ↓352
HR ↑583 ↑1097 ↑1182 ↑1164 ↑1175 ↑1176 ↑948 ↑1344 ↑1229 ↑1459 ↑972 ↑1175 ↑574
HU ↓73 ↑383 ↑458 ↑443 ↑453 ↑454 ↑89 ↑8 ↑424 ↑565 ↑214 ↑451 ↑477
IT ↓417 ↓352 ↓371 ↓356 ↓360 ↓604 ↑326 ↓327 ↓105 ↓511 ↓363 ↓336
IE ↑531 ↑1086 ↑1065 ↑1103 ↑1083 ↑851 ↑1212 ↑1169 ↑1377 ↑915 ↑1104 ↑1163
LT ↑886 ↑1483 ↑1503 ↑1553 ↑1512 ↑1377 ↑1846 ↑1567 ↑1890 ↑1295 ↑1557 ↑1557
LU ↑1834 ↑2447 ↑2537 ↑2529 ↑2437 ↑2301 ↑3598 ↑2717 ↑2944 ↑2368 ↑2540 ↑2581
LV ↑1227 ↑1837 ↑1937 ↑1770 ↑1792 ↑1609 ↑2377 ↑1912 ↑2312 ↑1652 ↑1876 ↑1949
MT ↑1913 ↑2560 ↑2645 ↑2532 ↑2621 ↑2380 ↑3782 ↑2771 ↑3037 ↑2492 ↑2626 ↑2678
NL ↓327 ↑71 ↑144 ↑92 ↑125 ↑104 ↓569 ↑65 ↑158 ↓133 ↑121 ↑143
PL ↑705 ↓463 ↓373 ↓373 ↓365 ↓364 ↓867 ↓468 ↓507 ↓648 ↓374 ↓392
PT ↓85 ↑361 ↑437 ↑400 ↑424 ↑412 ↑59 ↓41 ↑559 ↑230 ↑424 ↑438
RO ↓368 ↓63 ↑16 ↓2 ↑14 ↑8 ↓401 ↓778 ↓37 ↓235 ↑8 ↑8
SE ↓64 ↑392 ↑467 ↑451 ↑464 ↑463 ↑101 ↑35 ↑438 ↑574 ↑463 ↑479
SI ↑1189 ↑1792 ↑1892 ↑1743 ↑1858 ↑1755 ↑1584 ↑2329 ↑1879 ↑2253 ↑1626 ↑1928
SK ↑430 ↑929 ↑991 ↑944 ↑974 ↑960 ↑692 ↑988 ↑1103 ↑1223 ↑880 ↑972
Table 6: The impact of additional departures to Brexit (continued)
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Appendix D – The impact of any member state leaving
before the accession of Croatia
The following table presents the impact of any member state leaving the 27-member EU before
the accession of Croatia. The country labels in the columns refer to the country that is leaving
the EU, the rows show the remaining member states. The values represent the change (new
adjusted S-S power index)/(old adjusted S-S power index) in basis points (1/100th of 1%). Bold
indicates increasing, while italic signs decreasing power.
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IT
AT ↑584 ↑758 ↑648 ↑756 ↓553 ↑573 ↑654 ↑730 ↑424 ↑605 ↓181 ↑773 ↑204
BE ↑454 ↑512 ↑411 ↑514 ↓719 ↑332 ↑414 ↑481 ↑51 ↑365 ↓455 ↑535 ↓108
BG ↑860 ↑762 ↑797 ↑954 ↓413 ↑746 ↑800 ↑914 ↑597 ↑778 ↓45 ↑959 ↑304
CY ↑2648 ↑2542 ↑2733 ↑2770 ↑659 ↑2509 ↑2531 ↑2714 ↑2750 ↑2537 ↑1530 ↑2775 ↑2081
CZ ↑515 ↑410 ↑591 ↑486 ↓670 ↑407 ↑489 ↑560 ↑157 ↑440 ↓380 ↑608 ↑0
DE ↓373 ↓498 ↓301 ↓349 ↓332 ↓459 ↓350 ↓363 ↓186 ↓425 ↓422 ↓308 ↓131
DK ↑1079 ↑973 ↑1149 ↑1023 ↑1159 ↓295 ↑1026 ↑1125 ↑940 ↑984 ↑136 ↑1179 ↑552
EE ↑2411 ↑2317 ↑2492 ↑2297 ↑2515 ↑525 ↑2292 ↑2480 ↑2442 ↑2327 ↑1337 ↑2540 ↑1854
EL ↑470 ↑360 ↑534 ↑437 ↑536 ↓702 ↑364 ↑438 ↑79 ↑398 ↓432 ↑564 ↓76
ES ↓372 ↓521 ↓295 ↓314 ↓343 ↓661 ↓449 ↓312 ↓384 ↓416 ↓538 ↓313 ↓193
FI ↑1092 ↑980 ↑1165 ↑1038 ↑1171 ↓291 ↑961 ↑1045 ↑1138 ↑962 ↑154 ↑1195 ↑556
FR ↓384 ↓528 ↓318 ↓358 ↓355 ↓554 ↓477 ↓359 ↓391 ↓227 ↓443 ↓326 ↓290
HU ↑572 ↑460 ↑628 ↑514 ↑637 ↓646 ↑455 ↑520 ↑606 ↑228 ↑487 ↓318 ↑79
IT ↓368 ↓506 ↓299 ↓346 ↓335 ↓634 ↓461 ↓346 ↓371 ↓177 ↓428 ↓619 ↓310
IE ↑1241 ↑1118 ↑1308 ↑1195 ↑1316 ↓198 ↑1090 ↑1215 ↑1279 ↑1180 ↑1120 ↑285 ↑1350 ↑718
LT ↑1687 ↑1574 ↑1799 ↑1665 ↑1778 ↑102 ↑1599 ↑1680 ↑1743 ↑1746 ↑1632 ↑722 ↑1806 ↑1187
LU ↑2836 ↑2758 ↑2925 ↑2699 ↑2968 ↑771 ↑2715 ↑2716 ↑2905 ↑2976 ↑2742 ↑1656 ↑2972 ↑2285
LV ↑2076 ↑1969 ↑2201 ↑1973 ↑2183 ↑327 ↑1967 ↑2000 ↑2143 ↑2091 ↑1999 ↑1055 ↑2206 ↑1503
MT ↑2975 ↑2867 ↑3066 ↑2808 ↑3090 ↑831 ↑2821 ↑2841 ↑3042 ↑3139 ↑2854 ↑1776 ↑3097 ↑2407
NL ↑205 ↑98 ↑265 ↑137 ↑264 ↓965 ↑69 ↑136 ↑239 ↓408 ↑104 ↓806 ↑287 ↓538
PL ↓226 ↓364 ↓131 ↓180 ↓186 ↓1278 ↓285 ↓175 ↓224 ↓1592 ↓254 ↓1177 ↓159 ↓899
PT ↑528 ↑425 ↑603 ↑480 ↑594 ↓661 ↑411 ↑502 ↑569 ↑176 ↑445 ↓367 ↑620 ↑15
RO ↑45 ↓49 ↑112 ↑33 ↑117 ↓1180 ↓56 ↑34 ↑88 ↓670 ↓23 ↓1042 ↑131 ↓785
SE ↑586 ↑474 ↑636 ↑531 ↑652 ↓644 ↑472 ↑535 ↑618 ↑255 ↑504 ↓296 ↑681 ↑46
SI ↑2021 ↑1914 ↑2150 ↑1936 ↑2136 ↑298 ↑1926 ↑1963 ↑2085 ↑2044 ↑1960 ↑1016 ↑2154 ↑1454
SK ↑1113 ↑1000 ↑1177 ↑1056 ↑1187 ↓283 ↑975 ↑1063 ↑1149 ↑991 ↑1006 ↑163 ↑1219 ↑575
UK ↓398 ↓533 ↓318 ↓355 ↓364 ↓579 ↓473 ↓358 ↓396 ↓196 ↓439 ↓594 ↓336 ↓277
Table 7: The impact of any member state leaving before the accession of Croatia
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IE LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
AT ↑595 ↑684 ↑639 ↑671 ↑642 ↑513 ↑1123 ↑725 ↑100 ↑520 ↑665 ↑757 ↑523
BE ↑376 ↑431 ↑403 ↑421 ↑411 ↑250 ↑837 ↑483 ↑80 ↑286 ↑417 ↑515 ↑225
BG ↑772 ↑838 ↑780 ↑815 ↑793 ↑664 ↑1343 ↑918 ↑120 ↑700 ↑810 ↑929 ↑764
CY ↑2527 ↑2587 ↑2501 ↑2575 ↑2514 ↑2380 ↑3176 ↑2726 ↑300 ↑2482 ↑2568 ↑2735 ↑2373
CZ ↑431 ↑510 ↑455 ↑499 ↑468 ↑319 ↑929 ↑553 ↑90 ↑358 ↑502 ↑581 ↑314
DE ↓413 ↓343 ↓359 ↓352 ↓350 ↓618 ↑111 ↓357 ↓16 ↓536 ↓353 ↓293 ↑234
DK ↑966 ↑1044 ↑1013 ↑1047 ↑1023 ↑920 ↑1584 ↑1126 ↑150 ↑920 ↑1030 ↑1137 ↑906
EE ↑2313 ↑2367 ↑2268 ↑2346 ↑2278 ↑2164 ↑2932 ↑2471 ↑280 ↑2252 ↑2327 ↑2506 ↑2182
EL ↑400 ↑455 ↑428 ↑452 ↑430 ↑272 ↑878 ↑506 ↑80 ↑313 ↑442 ↑545 ↑254
ES ↓399 ↓314 ↓324 ↓315 ↓312 ↓726 ↓920 ↓368 ↓39 ↓538 ↓319 ↓281 ↑152
FI ↑976 ↑1052 ↑1021 ↑1059 ↑1041 ↑931 ↑1582 ↑1138 ↑150 ↑937 ↑1046 ↑1148 ↑912
FR ↓427 ↓354 ↓367 ↓362 ↓357 ↓691 ↓32 ↓380 ↓27 ↓554 ↓365 ↓311 ↑71
HU ↑487 ↑558 ↑507 ↑542 ↑520 ↑368 ↑960 ↑607 ↑90 ↑409 ↑532 ↑636 ↑369
IT ↓418 ↓344 ↓355 ↓349 ↓344 ↓670 ↓105 ↓359 ↓26 ↓536 ↓351 ↓298 ↑50
IE ↑1242 ↑1182 ↑1240 ↑1202 ↑1074 ↑1700 ↑1280 ↑160 ↑1082 ↑1228 ↑1282 ↑1038
LT ↑1636 ↑1640 ↑1711 ↑1659 ↑1510 ↑2168 ↑1738 ↑210 ↑1532 ↑1703 ↑1805 ↑1530
LU ↑2701 ↑2789 ↑2771 ↑2689 ↑2567 ↑3354 ↑2919 ↑330 ↑2665 ↑2746 ↑2926 ↑2556
LV ↑1979 ↑2076 ↑1952 ↑1972 ↑1830 ↑2586 ↑2137 ↑250 ↑1917 ↑2024 ↑2172 ↑1886
MT ↑2821 ↑2885 ↑2787 ↑2894 ↑2708 ↑3480 ↑3038 ↑340 ↑2795 ↑2874 ↑3042 ↑2686
NL ↑105 ↑153 ↑125 ↑137 ↑135 ↑453 ↑235 ↑60 ↑44 ↑131 ↑242 ↓139
PL ↓243 ↓169 ↓195 ↓169 ↓183 ↓549 ↓214 ↓17 ↓387 ↓176 ↓116 ↓544
PT ↑442 ↑519 ↑466 ↑510 ↑480 ↑330 ↑928 ↑90 ↑370 ↑502 ↑593 ↑328
RO ↓14 ↑52 ↑23 ↑38 ↑28 ↓89 ↑149 ↑90 ↓108 ↑38 ↑115 ↓405
SE ↑502 ↑557 ↑525 ↑555 ↑533 ↑390 ↑981 ↑623 ↑90 ↑546 ↑655 ↑374
SI ↑1935 ↑2030 ↑1912 ↑2000 ↑1927 ↑1795 ↑2539 ↑2092 ↑240 ↑1877 ↑2133 ↑1844
SK ↑980 ↑1070 ↑1042 ↑1077 ↑1055 ↑953 ↑1595 ↑1152 ↑150 ↑949 ↑1060 ↑926
UK ↓428 ↓356 ↓363 ↓359 ↓355 ↓683 ↓54 ↓389 ↓27 ↓562 ↓362 ↓309
Table 7: The impact of any member state leaving before the accession of Croatia (con-
tinued)
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Appendix E – The blocking minority rule
According to the Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union ”as from 1 November 2014, a
qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at
least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population
of the Union. A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the
qualified majority shall be deemed attained.”4
For the sake of simplicity, we left out the blocking minority rule in the calculations of the
adjusted power indices with the use of the software IOP. In the following, the effect of this
modification will be calculated.
In the current 28-member state case, there are only 10 variants of coalitions that are winning
only due to the blocking minority rule. Table 8 shows all coalitions that are not blocking
minorities even though they reach the population quota.
1 Germany France United Kingdom
2 Germany France Italy
3 Germany France Spain
4 Germany France Poland
5 Germany United Kingdom Italy
6 Germany United Kingdom Spain
7 Germany United Kingdom Poland
8 Germany Italy Spain
9 Germany Italy Poland
10 France United Kingdom Italy
Table 8: Coalitions which reach the population quota but cannot reject a decision in the
28-member EU
In the case of small countries, in other words, for countries not appearing in Table 8 (their
number is 23), by ignoring the blocking minority rule, we do not take them as a pivotal player
in 10 possible variations, but they are. Thus their Shapley-Shubik index should be increased by
(24! · 3! · 10)/28! = 1/8190 = 0.000122.
In the case of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom we need to
reduce the index. If France, Italy and the United Kingdom oppose a decision, they cannot block
it, until another country joins them, so Germany is not considered as a pivotal player despite it
plays this role. At the same time, we have counted Germany in nine variants as a pivotal player
(for example, in the blocking coalition of France, Germany and the United Kingdom), but it
does not play such a role. Therefore, the correction for Germany is:
24! · 3!− 25! · 2! · 9
28!
= −
444
491400
= −0.000904.
After Brexit, in the 27-member EU, there are 27! possible coalitions, and 19 variants involved
in the correction needed due to the blocking minority rule.
By ignoring the blocking minority rule, in the case of countries not appearing in Table 9
(their number is 12), we do not take them as a pivotal player in 19 possible variants despite
the fact that they are. Their Shapley-Shubik index should be increased by (23! · 3! · 19)/27! =
19/70200 = 0.000271.
We show the overall effect of these corrections for Malta. The Shapley-Shubik index of Malta,
calculated by the IOP software without the blocking minority rule, is 0.008487, which needs to
be increased by 1/8190. After Brexit, the Shapley-Shubik index of Malta according to our
4https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
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1 Germany France Italy
2 Germany France Spain
3 Germany France Poland
4 Germany France Romania
5 Germany France Netherlands
6 Germany France Belgium
7 Germany France Greece
8 Germany France Czech Republic
9 Germany France Portugal
10 Germany France Hungary
11 Germany France Sweden
12 Germany France Austria
13 Germany Italy Spain
14 Germany Italy Poland
15 Germany Italy Romania
16 Germany Italy Netherlands
17 Germany Spain Poland
18 France Italy Spain
19 France Italy Poland
Table 9: Coalitions that reach the population quota but cannot reject a decision in the
27-member EU after Brexit
calculation is 0.008036. As mentioned, it should be increased by 19/70200. With the payment
correction, the adjusted Shapley-Shubik index will be 0.007574. Therefore the accurate change
in power is 0.007574/(0.008487 + 0.000122) = 0.879751. The original result was 0.863331, the
difference is only 0.016421. Since Malta has the smallest Shapley-Shubik value, the adjustment
for the other countries is lower. Consequently, ignoring the blocking minority rule does not have
any significant effect on our results.
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